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Abstract
Three years after the judgment of the General Court in the De Capitani case, we assess whether the findings of the Court
have settled for good the debate between transparency and effectiveness in EU law-making or rather opened new ques-
tions on legislative transparency in the EU.
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The landmark judgement of the General Court in the
De Capitani (De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018)
has provided an important contribution in redefining the
boundaries of transparency in EU law-making. According
to most commentators, the General Court has clearly
opted for ‘access’ over ‘excess’ by giving prominence
to transparency over effectiveness when it comes to
law-making. Three years after the seminal decision, it is
useful to return to De Capitani to assess whether the
judgment has really settled for good the debate and
excluded the arguments of effectiveness from the func-
tioning of the EU model of representative democracy.
The arguments developed by the parties in the case
are a good illustration of the opposing approaches as to
the balance to be found between transparency and effec-
tiveness in EU law-making.
In its written submissions, De Capitani had taken the
radical view that efficiency is no objective of the legisla-
tive procedure. According to De Capitani, in a democratic
legislative procedure defined by openness, citizens´ par-
ticipation and public pressure can never be considered
as undermining the process. As a consequence, there is
nomargin left for Institutions to refuse access to a legisla-
tive document on the basis of Article 4(3) of Regulation
1049/2001 (Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 30 May 2001, 2001, p.43).
The three Institutions aligned in defending the oppo-
site view that a request for access could still be refused
on the basis of the need to protect the efficiency of tri-
logues as a working method. They did so, however, with
some nuances.
The European Parliament developed a rather classic
defence which stressed the specific nature of trilogues if
compared to the formal steps of the legislative process
only, to focus on the risks posed by the disclosure of the
specific documents at stake.
The Commission and the Council insisted on a ‘func-
tionalist’ argument focussing on the need to protect the
very function of trilogues, which would be undermined
by unfettered openness. The Commission pushed this
argument to the extreme on the basis of a case law devel-
oped in the framework of ongoing administrative pro-
ceedings (see in particular joined cases T-424/11 and
T-425/11 in ClientEarth v. European Commission, 2015)
and argued for a general presumption that access to
the fourth column of documents relating to ongoing
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trilogues would undermine the decision-making process.
Such a general presumption would be justified to pre-
serve the integrity of the conduct of the trilogue proce-
dure from the intervention of third parties, in light of the
very specific function of tripartite negotiations—that is
to explore the possibility of an agreement on a common
text between representatives of the co-legislators to be
then subject to validation in the official steps of the leg-
islative procedure.
The Council supported the Commission’s argument
in favour of a general presumption against disclosure.
It however further suggested that a distinction should
be drawn between formal legislative documents and tri-
logue documents since they have a mere preparatory
character, do not reflect the positions of the legislators
and in fact are not even known to them (since it is up
to the negotiators to inform back the respective insti-
tutions). The higher standard of transparency applica-
ble to formal legislative documents would therefore not
be applicable to trilogue tables since the rational for a
wider access—namely the need to allow citizens to hold
decision-makers into account for their choices—would
not apply with the same intensity here.
As it is known, the General Court decided the case in
favour of De Capitani. The Court however did not follow
the radical approach proposed by the applicant, which
would have prevented any refusal to access requests
in the framework of legislative proceedings. Such an
approach would have manifestly been against the let-
ter of Regulation 1049/2001, which in no way excludes
documents relating to legislative procedures from the
scope of application of its set of exceptions. The only
serious possibility to overcome this unambiguous word-
ing would be to argue the illegality of the relevant
provision of the Regulation itself, which however was
not attempted by De Capitani, and appears anyhow far-
fetched in light of the case law of the Court of Justice.
The judgment follows the long-standing case law on
legislative transparency which dates back to the Turco
(Sweden and Turco v. Council, 2008) and Access Info
Europe (Access Info Europe v. Council, 2011) judgments.
The principles of publicity and transparency are inherent
to the EU legislative process and citizens must be in a
position to follow in detail the decision-making process
within the institutions to be able to exercise their demo-
cratic rights. From that point of view, no distinction can
be accepted between the various steps of the legislative
process and no relevance can be given to the specific
nature of trilogue negotiations.
Still, while rejecting the ‘functionalist’ approach in
the formargued by Council and Commission, theGeneral
Court did not dismiss altogether the need to take into
account the effectiveness of the legislative process.
While generally overlooked by the commentators of the
judgment, the relevant passages of the judgement pro-
vide important qualifications to the overall findings.
First, the Court confirms its previous Tobacco case
law (Herbert Smith Freehils LLP v. Commission, 2016;
Herbert Smith Freehils LLP v. Council, 2016; Philip Morris
v. Commission, 2016) and acknowledges that the risk of
external pressure can constitute a legitimate ground for
restricting access to documents related to the legisla-
tive decision-making process. The threshold set by the
General Court is admittedly particularly high, since:
The reality of such external pressure must, however,
be established with certainty, and evidence must be
adduced to show that there is a reasonably and fore-
seeable risk that the decision…would be substantially
affected owing to that external pressure. (De Capitani
v. European Parliament, 2018, §99)
In the case of a legislative procedure, this requires to
demonstrate that the disclosure of the requested docu-
ment would lead to “a reaction beyond what could be
expected from the public by any member of a legislative
body who proposes an amendment to draft legislation”
(De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018, §99).
The General Court seems therefore to suggest that
a distinction may be drawn between the form of influ-
ence that is normally associated to the public debate
on a legislative file and other—more invasive and thus
pathological—forms of interference which would war-
rant the protection of the decision making.
Second, the General Court seems to admit that
the legislative process requires a ‘space to think’ that
needs to be protected. Even if trilogues are a substan-
tial part of the legislative procedure, ”discussions may
take place during (trilogue) meetings for the preparation
of the (compromise text) between the various partici-
pants, so that the possibility of a free exchange of views
is not called into question” (De Capitani v. European
Parliament, 2018, §106).
What this passage implies is that while being part
of the legislative process, trilogues remain exempted
from other requirements that would normally be asso-
ciated with the formal steps of the legislative process:
the pro-active publication of documents, the publicity of
the debates, and the need for a fully-fledged linguistic
regime of the documents used for deliberations.
These findings show a certain pragmatism of the
General Court in striking a balance between the need
for transparency which is proper to the legislative pro-
cess and the need to preserve the effectiveness of the
legislative negotiations. The balance consists in apply-
ing to trilogue documents the same enhanced standard
of transparency when it comes to access to documents
requests,while allowing a certain leniencywhen it comes
to the application of the broader publicity regime proper
to law-making.
It is the same pragmatism that had led the
Ombudsman to acknowledge the positive role of tri-
logues and to take a clear position in support of the
need to protect a certain level of confidentiality during
the discussions, position which attracted much criticism
by the supporter of transparency at all costs. As the
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Ombudsman had rightly pointed out, without preserv-
ing the possibility of a ‘space to think’ during these
inter-institutional exchanges, the core of the negotia-
tions would slide into even more informal formats with
greater risks for the transparency of the overall process
(European Ombudsman, 2016, see in particular §§5–6,
29–31, 68–69).
However, the pragmatism of the General Court has
its shortcomings too. The line between the normal reac-
tion that can be expected from the public and patho-
logical interference in the legislative process is one
which is difficult to draw. Let aside the extreme cases
where pressure on the co-legislators could take the
form of a criminal conduct (e.g., corruption of dele-
gates taking parts in trilogues prompted by the disclo-
sure of a document revealing their positions), it remains
extremely difficult to determine at which point a legiti-
mate attempt to influence the decision making becomes
an undue interference.
The Tobacco case law seems to suggest that a key fac-
tor in the assessment is the fact that the document is
explicitly requested by someone who has a vested com-
mercial interest in the decision-making process and who
intends to use that document to advance such an inter-
est. Many would however argue that lobbying by vested
interests is very much part of the public debate around
legislation. Moreover, the ingenuity of the applicants in
the Tobacco cases—who made clear their identities and
the objective they pursued—could easily be avoided by
asking for access in anonymous form or as a general
member of the public.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the pragma-
tism of the General Court reveals a conceptual weak-
ness in the reasoning of the judgment. There is in
fact a certain contradiction in proclaiming—without
qualification—that trilogues are “a decisive stage in the
legislative process” and that “trilogue tables form part
of the legislative process” (De Capitani v. European
Parliament, 2018, §§70, 75) and then accepting that the
full regime of publicity usually associatedwith the legisla-
tive debates does not apply to trilogue discussions.
This contradiction is the inevitable consequence of
a monolithic conception of the legislative process and of
the documents that accompany it. The reality is however
more complex. Besides the key official milestones and
documents that register the expression of the political
will by the co-legislators, many other layers of prepara-
tory activities and documents both by political actors
and by support services concur in law-making. All these
intermediary steps and preparatory documents cannot
be considered as having the same nature and be subject
to the same openness regime without grinding to a halt
the legislative machinery. For instance, the public inter-
est in disclosure cannot be the same in relation to a doc-
ument which formally expresses the position of the co-
legislator and a merely preparatory document reporting
the advice of an official to the negotiator (thiswas indeed
the case in Tobacco). Only access to the former is essen-
tial to allow public scrutiny on the decision makers and
to strengthen the democratic participation of citizens to
the decision-making process.
The General Court tells us that in this complex land-
scape of intermediary steps and preparatory documents,
trilogues and four column tables play a peculiar role
which warrants a specific regime in terms of openness.
The fact of not spelling out the criteria that justify such a
regime, leaves however open a number of questions. For
instance, having regard to the relevance that the Court
gives to the possibility of having a free exchange of views
and effective negotiations during trilogues, it would not
seem appropriate to apply the same standard of assess-
ment on one hand to documents that report the result of
the negotiations and on the other to documents that are
tabled before the trilogues and contain compromise pro-
posals to be discussed during those forthcoming negotia-
tions. Even more, the logic of the judgment would seem
to exclude that the same regime of openness apply to
internal documents that may be drafted for the purpose
of forming the institutions’ negotiation strategy and iden-
tify the area of flexibility and the concessions that could
be made during the tripartite negotiations. Disclosure of
these internal documents would expose the strategy of
the negotiator, create asymmetric negotiating positions
and undermine trust, with the effect of compromising
the effectiveness of the trilogue setting and shifting the
real negotiations in other fora. It would prevent the pos-
sibility of that ‘free exchange of views’ that the General
Court does not call into question.
Following the judgement in De Capitani, the insti-
tutions have decided not to appeal and have taken
steps to implement its findings. Documents reporting the
outcomes of trilogues are now systematically identified
and as a rule given access to upon request. Trilogues
documents are made public by default once the nego-
tiations are closed. However, as the remarks above
show, the judgment has not definitively settled the diffi-
cult balance between transparency and effectiveness in
the various articulations of the legislative process. The
many questions left open by the General Court have
already emerged in the day-to-day handling of access
requests (as shown for instance by a recent confirma-
tory decision adopted by the Council on 16 February
2021 partially refusing access to documents prepar-
ing positions for trilogue negotiations; Council of the
European Union, 2021) and anticipate a new episode
in the debate on legislative transparency (the European
Ombudsman has just launched an inquiry on complaint
360/2021/TE brought against the Council’s confirmatory
decision; European Ombudsman, 2021).
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